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McColl: Good Faith in Chapter Eleven Reorganizations

NOTE
GOOD FAITH IN CHAPTER ELEVEN
REORGANIZATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although not expressly required by statute, good faith has
been established as a prerequisite for Chapter 11 reorganizations
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The most commonly
cited statutory authority for the good faith requirement is section 1112(b) of Title 11 of the United States Code,' which provides for the conversion or dismissal of a case for "cause" and
includes nine specific situations that qualify as "causes." Several
bankruptcy courts have concluded that the list of causes is not

exclusive and that a lack of good faith is an additional cause for
dismissal or conversion.

The legislative history of section

1. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, on request of a
party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case
under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title or may dismiss a case
under this chapter, whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate,
for cause, including(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation;
(2) inability to effectuate a plan;
(3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within any
time fixed by the court;
(5) denial of confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of additional
time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan;
(6) revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144 of this title,
and denial of confirmation of another plan or a modified plan under section
1129 of this title;
(7) inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed plan;
(8) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan; and
(9) termination of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan.
(emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., In re McLaury, 25 B.R. 30 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); In re Pappas, 17
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1112(b) supports this conclusion; Congress did not intend for
the list of "causes" in section 1112(b) to be exhaustive and, in
fact, encouraged the courts to consider individual facts in every
case.3 Congress also emphasized that the courts have broad discretion to determine whether "cause" for dismissal or conversion
exists.4
A second provision cited for a good faith requirement is section 362(d)(1) of Title 11 of the United States Code, which allows a court to grant relief from an automatic stay "for cause,
including lack of adequate protection." 5 Bankruptcy courts have
found a lack of good faith to be "cause" enough for relief, independent of the lack of adequate protection specified in section
362(d)(1).1 The legislative history7 of section 362(d) shows that
Congress shared this nonrestrictive view of the term "cause.""
B.R. 662 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 B.R. 36
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Dutch Flat Inv. Co., 6 B.R. 470 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980).
3. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 117, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787, 5903 states:
[11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)] gives wide discretion to the court to make an appropriate disposition of the case sua sponte or upon motion of a party in interest,
or the court is permitted to convert a reorganization case to a liquidation case
or to dismiss the case, whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the
estate, but only for cause. Cause may include [the nine specific factors enumerated in § 1112(b)]. This list is not exhaustive. The court will be able to consider other factors as they arise, and to use its equitable powers to reach an
appropriate result in individual cases. The power of the court to act sua sponte
should be used sparingly and only in emergency situations.
See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 405, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6361, 6362 (employs language virtually identical to that quoted
above); Analysis of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1979 Ann. Surv. of Bankr. L.
197, 352.
4. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 3, at 5903; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 6361.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest. ...
(emphasis added).
6. In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549, 558-60 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). See also In
re Hewitt, 16 B.R. 973 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982); In re Beach Club, 22 B.R. 597 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1982); In re Lotus Invs., Inc., 16 B.R. 592 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
7. "[T]he lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of the party requesting relief from the stay is one cause for relief, but it is not the only cause." H.R. REP. No.
595, supra note 3, at 6300.
8. At least one court has recognized 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) as authority for dismissal of
a case when the debtor acts in bad faith. See In re Matchup, Inc., 13 B.R. 147 (Bankr.
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This Note examines the nature of the good faith requirement in Chapter 11 cases. In particular, it discusses situations in
which a good faith challenge may arise and the various factors a
court might consider in assessing a debtor's good faith.
IH.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT

Since the question of whether amthority exists within the
Bankruptcy Code for a good faith requirement has been settled,
the courts have begun to advance various justifications for its
use. A common justification is the protection of the bankruptcy
court's jurisdictional integrity. "Good faith .. . [has] merged

into the power of the court to protect its jurisdictional integrity
from schemes of improper petitioners seeking to circumvent jurisdictional restrictions and from petitioners with demonstrable

S.D. Fla. 1981). Section 305(a) allows the court to abstain from a case if "the interests of
creditors and the debtor would be better served by such a dismissal .... ." In In re
Matchup, Inc., the court held that dismissal would best serve the interests of both the
creditors and the debtor because the schedules were incomplete, the corporate debtor's
president was incapable of representing the debtor itself, the president's assertion that
counsel could not be afforded conflicted with representations in the schedules, the debtor
had no income for at least two years, there was no ongoing business to rehabilitate, and
the debtor was partially owned by another corporation.
Since all creditors and the debtor must benefit from the court's refusal to hear the
case, most bankruptcy courts will not use § 305(a) to dismiss a petition, even when the
debtor's conduct indicates a lack of good faith. See, e.g., In re Mineral Hill Corp., 16
B.R. 687 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982); In re WPAS, Inc., 6 B.R. 44 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980).
Although § 305(a) has been interpreted as an enlargement of, rather than a restriction
upon the court's power to dismiss, see In re Fast Food Properties, Ltd. No. 1, 5 B.R. 539
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980), the majority of bankruptcy courts use § 305(a) sparingly and
not as a substitute for a bad faith dismissal under § 1112(b) or § 362(d)(1). See, e.g., In
re Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 16 B.R. 750, 754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Mineral
Hill Corp., 16 B.R. 687, 688 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982). See also In re Luftek, 6 B.R. B.R.
539, 548 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980), in which the court stated:
[C]ourts will have to exercise great care in using the discretion granted by
section 305(a) to dismiss a case. To be sure, it could be said that dismissal
would be in the interests of creditors and the debtor in many of the proceedings commenced under the Bankruptcy Code; this Court could dispose of much
of its calendar if its discretion was unbridled. There is an inherent risk to our
system of jurisprudence in any Act of Congress which gives the courts such
broad powers to refuse jurisdiction over a case. This risk is compounded by the
finality and non-appealability of an order entered under this section. Indeed,
by giving an example of a situation in which abstention or dismissal would be
appropriate, Congress has indicated that it intended section 305(a) dismissals
to be the exception rather than a rule.
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[sic] frivolous purposes absent any economic reality."' This inherent power of the bankruptcy court was considered by Congress when the new Bankruptcy Code was enacted. The House
Report on section 1112(b) states that "[t]he court will be able to
consider other factors as they arise, and to use its equitable
power to reach an appropriate result in individual cases." 1 0
Clearly, good faith is a condition necessary to prevent improper imposition on the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. It is
crucial to the courts' integrity that petitioners be prevented
from using the Bankruptcy Code as "part and parcel of a
scheme whereby the form of a judicial remedy. . . [supplies] a
protective cover for a fraudulent design."1' 1
A second justification for the good faith requirement advanced by the bankruptcy courts is that the debtor's legal status
and economic condition must fall within the purpose of Chapter
11. The filing of a Chapter 11 petition is intended to provide
relief from financial distress by facilitating the "rehabilitation of
an ongoing business. 1 2 The goal of reorganization is to preserve
the debtor's assets by saving them from premature sales, such as
foreclosures, so that the interests of both the debtor and its unsecured creditors will not be completely extinguished. While the
debtor is allowed to restructure his debts to achieve a "fresh
start,"1 3 the creditors are permitted to avoid foreclosure actions
to achieve a greater return on their claims. The tension between
the competing goals of the debtor and the creditor has resulted
14
in a balancing of interests by the bankruptcy courts.

9. In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 B.R. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980). See also In re Levinsky, 23 B.R. 210 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Sung Hi Lim,
7 B.R. 316 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1980).
10. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 6362.
11. Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 355 (1932). See also Tucker v. Texas Am. Syndicate, 170 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1948). But see In re World of English, 16 B.R. 817 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1982) in which the court said that it is "better able to protect its jurisdictional
integrity in situations in which debtors are before it," than it is by dismissal of the case
for lack of good faith. Id. at 821.
12. In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., 18 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982).
13. In re Alison Corp., 9 B.R. 827, 829 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
14. This balancing was described by one bankruptcy court as follows:
The provisions of the Code dealing with rehabilitation and reorganization
must be viewed as direct lineal descendents of a legal philosophy solidly embedded in American bankruptcy law ... [The origins of this law] disclose a
common theme and objective: avoidance of the consequences of economic dismemberment and liquidation, and the preservation of ongoing values in a man-
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A third justification is the apparent absence of any congressional intent to do away with a good faith test. Although not
included as an express safeguard in Chapter 11 of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, good faith has been an integral part of bankruptcy philosophy for almost a century. It was an express condition of confirmation under the 1898 Act.1 5 Good faith was also
stipulated for both the filing and confirmation of proposed compositions or extensions under the 1933 Act.1 6 The 1933 Act also
required good faith for the confirmation of a farmer's proposal
for composition or an extension of time17 and for the approval of
a plan for railroad reorganization.' s Under Section 77B of the
1934 Act, good faith was an express prerequisite to court approval of a petition for the reorganization of a corporation", and
confirmation was allowed only after the judge was satisfied that
good faith accompanied the proposal.2 ° Similarly, Chapter X of
the 1938 Act made good faith an express condition both to filing
of the petition for reorganization by a corporate debtor and to
4
M
23
22
of
confirmation of the plan. 21 Chapters XI, XII, and XII

ner which does equity and is fair to rights and interests of the parties affected.
But the perimeters of this potential mark the borderline between fulfillment
and perversion; between accomplishing the objectives of rehabilitation and reorganization, and the use of these statutory provisions to destroy and undermine the legitimate rights and interests of those intended to benefit by this
statutory policy. That borderline is patrolled by courts of equity, armed with
the doctrine of good faith ...
In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549, 558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). See also American
United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 145 (1940); SEC v. United States
Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 435 (1940); In re First Dade Corp., 17 B.R.
887, 890 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1982). Cf. Louisville Title Co.'s Receiver v. Crab Orchard
Banking Co., 249 Ky. 736, 61 S.W.2d 615 (1933)(recognition of equitable principles in
state receivership proceedings). See also Gaffney, Bankruptcy Petitions Filed in Bad
Faith: What Actions Can Creditor'sCounsel Take?, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 205 (1980).
15. Section 12(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided that an offer of composition could not be confirmed by the court unless "the offer and its acceptance [were] in
good faith ...

."

Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (1898).

16. Section 74(a) of the 1933 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 required
the judge to approve the petition if it complied with the section and had "been filed in
good faith." Pub. L. No. 72-420, 47 Stat. 1467 (1933). In addition section 74(g)(4) required the court to confirm the proposal if "the offer and its acceptance [were] in good
faith, and [were] not. . . made or procured except as herein provided, or by any means,
promises or acts herein forbidden." Pub. L. No. 72-420, 47 Stat. 1467, 1468 (1933).
17. Pub. L. No. 72-420, § 75(i)(3), 47 Stat. 1467, 1472 (1933).
18. Pub. L. No. 72-420, § 77(g)(3), 47 Stat. 1467, 1479 (1933).
19. Pub. L. No. 73-296, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912 (1934).
20. Pub. L. No. 73-296, § 77B(f)(6), 48 Stat. 911, 919 (1934).
21. Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, 887, 897 (1938).
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the 1938 Act also prohibited confirmation of arrangements with
creditors unless the court was satisfied that the debtor's good
faith existed.
The current rehabilitation and reorganization provisions of
the 1978 Code are viewed by the courts as "direct lineal
descendents of a legal philosophy solidly embedded in American
bankruptcy law."2 5 Good faith is considered an inseparable component of that philosophy. 26 Many bankruptcy courts utilize the
following reasoning:
It would be more than anomalous to conclude that in consolidating the provisions of Chapters X, XI, and XII in Chapter 11
of the Code, Congress intended to do away with a safeguard
against abuse and misuse of process which had been established and accepted as part of bankruptcy philosophy (either
by statute or decisional law) for almost a century. "Good faith"
must therefore be viewed as an implicit prerequisite to the
filing or continuation of a proceeding under Chapter 11 of the
27
Code.

This rationale is further supported by the lack of any evidence
in the legislative history or in the Code itself of congressional
intent to eliminate the good faith safeguard from bankruptcy
law.28
A fourth justification for the good faith requirement is its
practicality. At least one court has announced that "power must
exist 'in every court to control the disposition of the causes on
its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel
and for litigants.' ,29 Dismissal or relief from an automatic stay
for lack of good faith is believed to be an appropriate exercise of
a court's inherent power to control its case load.

22. Pub. L. No. 75-696, §§ 361, 366(5), 52 Stat. 840, 911-12 (1938).
23. Pub. L. No. 75-696, §§ 467, 472(4), 52 Stat. 840, 923 (1938).
24. Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, 934 (1938).
25. In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549, 558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). Victory Construction contains an unusual but useful Appendix which lists by Code section topic

numerous cases dealing with the good faith standard. Id. at 565-69.
26. E.g., In re Mogul, 17 B.R. 680 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re FJD, Inc., 24 B.R.

138 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1982).
27. In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549, 558. See also cases cited supra note 26.
28. In re First Dade Corp., 17 B.R. 887, 891 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
29. In re 299 Jack-Hemp Assocs., 20 B.R. 412 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)(quoting Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).
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III. TYPICAL FACT PATTERNS

Three basic fact situations give rise to good faith challenges.
None are exclusive and elements of each are frequently present
in a given case. The most common is an attempt by the debtor
to fraudulently invoke the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
In re Nancant, Inc.,30 provides a typical example of this situation. In Nancant the debtor was a dummy corporation to which
property was transferred immediately prior to the corporation's
filing for Chapter 11 reorganization. The amount of secured indebtedness and real estate taxes due greatly exceed the value of
this transferred property, which was the corporation's only asset.
Only one general unsecured creditor for a nominal amount existed, and the debtor had never operated a business on the property. If the debtor had followed normal procedures, it would
have had to pay the taxes due before seeking an abatement. By
filing for reorganization, the debtor hoped to avoid selling the
property to prepay the taxes and to have a bankruptcy court
determine its tax liability.
The court focused on the debtor's purpose for invoking the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and dismissed the case for lack
of good faith. Although no single factor was deemed conclusive,
the court considered the following facts: the paucity of unsecured creditors, for whom business reorganization was principally created; the absence of an operating company with a business and economic history; the lack of a proposal for future
operations of the debtor corporation, except for a vague development plan concerning the transferred property; and the a transfer of that asset to the newly-formed corporation on the eve of
bankruptcy.31 The putative need for reorganization was apparently created by the debtor for the sole purpose of bringing the
encumbered property under the protection of the bankruptcy
court.'
Other attempts to fraudulently invoke the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court have ranged from the creation of a dummy
entity3 2 to the submission of false material statements to the

30. 8 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
31. Id. at 1009.
32. In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 B.R. 549 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); In re Dutch Flat Inv.
Co., 6 B.R. 470 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980).
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court. 33 In In re Verrazzano Towers, Inc.,3 4 an officer of the

debtor corporation falsely stated in a certificate to the court that
a special meeting of the debtor's board of directors had been
held, that the board had resolved to file for relief under Chapter
11, and that the officer himself was both president and secretary
of the corporation. The imposter filed the Chapter 11 petition
without knowledge or consent of the two other directors of the
debtor. The court found the false material statements to be
aimed at achieving an improper commencement of the Chapter
11 proceeding, held the improper conduct dispositive of the good
faith issue, and dismissed the case. 5
A second fact pattern which has arisen in Chapter 11 proceedings is an attempt by a debtor to shield his assets from the
6
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In In re Eden Associates,"
the debtor corporation was created and property was conveyed
to it by an individual from his more affluent, closely held corporation. The debtor corporation was a shell with no assets other
than the transferred property, no bona fide creditors, and no
ongoing business. Thus, there was no business enterprise to rehabilitate. The individual had attempted to shield the assets of
his wealthier corporation by allowing the bankruptcy court to
reach only the assets held by the dummy corporation. The court
concluded that the debtor had impermissibly abused the court's
37
jurisdiction and dismissed the case for lack of good faith.
A third fact situation involves the filing of a Chapter 11 petition by the debtor on the eve of foreclosure proceedings. In In
re Lotus Investments, Inc.,8 the debtor corporation was created
and the purchaser's interest in certain property transferred to it
after a mortgagee commenced foreclosure action but before the
ordered foreclosure sale. The property was the sole asset of the
debtor. The debtor did not give any consideration for the property, and there was no evidence that the conveyance was for legitimate business purposes. The property was not proved necessary for an effective reorganization of the debtor. Further, the

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

In re Verrazzano Towers, Inc., 10 B.R. 387 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id.
Id. at 408-09.
13 B.R. 578 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id.at 585.
16 B.R. 592 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). See infra text accompanying note 61.
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debtor did not provide, nor offer to provide, any additional payments or substitute liens to adequately protect the mortgagee's
interest. Consequently, the court held that the mortgagee was
entitled to relief from the automatic stay with respect to the
property scheduled for sale because the debtor had not filed his
petition in good faith.39
Frequently, the relief sought by the petitioner in Chapter 11
cases is the automatic stay itself and not the opportunity to reorganize its debts to stay in business. This motive is exemplified
by In re 299 Jack-Hemp Associates 0 in which a partnership
filed for relief after a mortgagee had obtained a foreclosure judgment on property that was part of a decedent's estate. The coexecutors under the will had created the partnership to qualify
as a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.41 The court reasoned
that the co-executors were trying to circumvent administration
of the property by the probate court.42 Since the co-executors
were merely seeking an automatic stay which would prevent the
impending foreclosure sale of the property, the debtor's petition
was dismissed for lack of good faith.43
IV.

DEFINING THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD

Although the bankruptcy courts agree that a good faith
standard exists and is justified, various interpretations of the
standard are used. In re Victory Construction Co., Inc.44 ilus-

trates the "new debtor syndrome" definition of the good faith
standard. In finding a lack of good faith, the court in Victory
emphasized that the a debtor entity was created shortly before it
fied a Chapter 11 petition. Other factors, such as the lack of an
ongoing business to protect, were noted by the court, but creation of the debtor on the eve of filing was apparently dispositive
of the good faith issue.
Several bankruptcy courts have not been satisfied with the
Victory approach45 and have applied the standard suggested in
39. Lotus Invs., Inc. 16 B.R. at 596.

40. 20 B.R. 412 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d).
42. Jack-Hemp. Assocs., 20 B.R. at 413.
43. Id.

44. 9 B.R. 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
45. E.g., In re The Beach Club, 22 B.R. 597 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982); In re Levinsky,
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Shapiro v. Wilgus.46 The Shapiro test focuses on whether "any

of the substantive or procedural rights of any of the creditors to
assets, available prior to the transfer of property, have been altered or eroded by the transfer and subsequent Chapter 11
filing.

'47

This approach seeks to avoid a bar to legitimate reor-

ganization attempts which involve the creation of a new debtor
immediately prior to filing. "The timeliness of the change of entity and/or transfer of property is not controlling.

'48

With the

Shapiro approach, the courts' main concern is the presence or
absence of a detriment to the creditors rather than an advantage
to the individual(s) or business(es) that created the new debtor
entity. If no fraud is perpetrated upon any creditor and no creditor is hindered in the collection of a claim, then the delay is
considered procedural, not substantive; and the court will allow
the debtor's petition to stand.
At least one court has found the Shapiro standard unacceptable because it places "undue emphasis on the 'intent to use
Chapter 11 to delay the secured creditors in the enforcement of
their rights.' ,49 According to the court in In re Eden Associates,
the preferred method is to probe for good faith on a case by case
basis with emphasis on the debtor's intent to abuse the judicial
process rather than to delay creditors.5 0 In theory, this approach
is broader since many debtor manipulations, such as the shielding of unencumbered assets from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, are abuses of the judicial process, but may not
cause delay to creditors.
V.

FACTORS CONSIDERED

Regardless of which standard is used, the concept of good
faith requires that a court's analysis be highly factual. Too many
23 B.R. 210 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Nancant, 8 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
46. 287 U.S. 348 (1932). See also In re Mallard Assocs., 463 F. Supp. 1259, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Northland Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 1977); In re
Metropolitan Realty Corp., 433 F.2d 676, 677-78 (5th Cir. 1970).
47. In re Northwest Recreation Activities, Inc., 4 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980). See also In re Levinsky, 23 B.R. 210, 218 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
48. In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980).
49. In re Eden Assocs., 13 B.R. 578, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)(quoting In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549, 564-65 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981)).
50. In re Eden Assocs., 13 B.R. at 578, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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variables are involved in the typical debtor's case to avoid considering factors ranging from the debtor's motive to his prospects of economic success. Although it is possible to isolate several factors that are commonly examined by the bankruptcy
courts, these are in no way exclusive. Further, no single factor is
usually determinative of the good faith issue.
Last minute changes in form by the debtor, such as the creation of a "new debtor" entity, will trigger close scrutiny by
bankruptcy courts. These transformations may indicate an attempt to manufacture a jurisdictional basis or to shield certain
assets, but the courts "will not blindly impute bad faith under
such circumstances."5 1 If the "new debtor" entity has no assets
except a single piece of property acquired shortly after its creation, the courts have frequently found it to be a mere shell or
front for the true debtor.5 2 If the debtor can establish a legitimate business purpose for creating the new entity, however, the
courts have concluded that the true debtor acted in good faith.5 3
Conversely, the lack of a valid reason for formation of the "new
debtor" has been interpreted as an indication of bad faith." Legitimate business motives recognized by the courts include the
conservation of debtors' investments,55 the uncertain state of a
debtor's health, 56 a liquidation through sale of assets,57 and the
addition of managerial experience coupled with the potential for
greater financial resources.5

A few courts have found no evi-

dence of bad faith when the true debtor could have filed the
Chapter 11 petition himself, even though he created a new entity to do so." These courts have reasoned that formation of the
new debtor in such instances was unnecessary for filing and did
not hinder the creditors' recourse to their collateral.
Another question asked by the bankruptcy courts is

51. In re Levinsky, 23 B.R. 210, 218 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).

52. See, e.g., In re Eden Assocs., 13 B.R. 578 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Lotus
Invs., Inc., 16 B.R. 592 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).

53. E.g., In re The Beach Club, 22 B.R. 597 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982).
54. In re FJD, Inc., 24 B.R. 138 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1982).

55. In re The Beach Club, 22 B.R. 597, 599 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982).
56. In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., 18 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982).
57. Id.
58. In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 B.R. 36, 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980).
59. In re The Beach Club, 22 B.R. 597 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982); In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., 18 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982).
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whether the debtor filed the petition on the eve of foreclosure.60
Last minute filing is frequently an attempt by the debtor to delay enforcement of the creditors' rights, especially when accompanied by the transfer of assets from an entity ineligible for
bankruptcy relief and an absence of a legitimate business purpose for the transfer.61 Courts have refused to find bad faith despite a late filing date when the petition was "filed with honesty
of purpose and with a reasonable hope of success.

' 62

If the

debtor can establish that the late filing was the only available
mechanism for preserving his troubled, but viable, business,
then the court may overlook the timing of his effort. When foreclosed property is necessary to the debtor's successful reorganization, the impact of filing immediately prior to the sale is lessened. At least one court has emphasized that the "preeminent
purpose of Chapter 11 is to give a debtor an extension of time to
restructure debts" so a late filing does not violate the spirit of
Chapter 11 unless concrete evidence of bad faith is present.6e
The bankruptcy courts will also consider the presence of unsecured creditors since a major objective of Chapter 11 business
reorganization is the protection of such creditors.6 4 "If virtually
all of the indebtedness runs to secured creditors, and there is no
equity in the property which would benefit unsecured creditors,
the invocation of Chapter 11 proceedings is an abuse of the
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction.

' 65

Yet, the lack of unsecured

creditors should not outweigh other competing factors and require a finding of bad faith.
The reasonable probability of submission and confirmation
of a plan of reorganization is another element considered by the
bankruptcy courts. Most courts will examine both the potential
for proposal of a plan and the economic feasibility of the plan
once submitted.66 However, one court has refused to consider
60. E.g., In re Dolton Lodge Trust No. 35188, 22 B.R. 918, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1982); In re Hewitt, 16 B.R. 973, 981 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982).
61. In re Lotus Inva., Inc., 16 B.R. 592, 595 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). See supra note
38 and accompanying text.
62. In re Hewitt, 16 B.R. 973, 981 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982).
63. In re Levinsky, 23 B.R. 210, 221 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
64. E.g., In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., 18 B.R. 164, 168 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982); In
re FJD, Inc., 24 B.R. 138, 141 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1982).
65. In re FJD, Inc., 24 B.R. 138, 141 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1982).
66. E.g., In re Pappas, 17 B.R. 662, 668 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re Dolton Lodge
Trust No. 35188, 22 B.R. 918, 923 (Bankr. N.D. IMI.1982).
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whether reorganization is reasonably possible until after the
debtor actually files a plan.6 7 This court reasoned that, in all
fairness, the debtor must be given an opportunity to establish
good faith by filing a plan. 8 The likelihood of submission of a
plan is ordinarily an important factor, especially when the sole
creditor is fully secured, has refused to consent to the plan, and
has opposed the proceeding by moving for a dismissal.6 9 Unfavorable economic circumstances may indicate that the entire
proceeding is just a stalling device utilized by the debtor to harass his creditors. In addition to the financial aspects of any proposed plan for the debtor's business operation, the courts also
consider the degree of protection provided for the creditors.70
Lack of adequate protection indicates a likelihood that confirmation of an acceptable plan will not occur.
Bankruptcy courts also regularly dismiss cases for lack of
good faith when the debtor entity is not an ongoing business.7 '
The primary purpose of Chapter 11 as reflected in its legislative
history is to provide for the rehabilitation of troubled business. 72
Thus, the reorganization proceeding is unnecessary if there is no
viable business to protect. Frequently a debtor entity will file for
relief, even though it is not a bona fide business organization, in
an attempt to shield other wealthier entities from the court's jurisdiction.73 If the debtor can convince the court however that

67. In re Weathersfield Farms, Inc., 11 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980).
68. Id. at 153.
69. In re Dutch Flat Inv. Co., 6 B.R. 470, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980).
70. E.g., In re Andrews, 17 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re The Beach
Club, 22 B.R. 597, 600 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982).
71. E.g., In re Mogul, 17 B.R. 680 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Eden Assocs., 13
B.R. 578 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
72. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 6179 states:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is
to restructure a business' [sic] finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its
stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are
used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more
valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return on assets that
a business can produce is inadequate to compensate those who have invested
in the business. Cash flow problems may develop, and require creditors of the
business, both trade creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for payment of
their claims. If the business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be
returned to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize than
to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
73. E.g., In re FJD, Inc., 24 B.R. 138, 141 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1982); In re Eden Assocs.,
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the petition was filed to preserve its status as an ongoing concern, thereby protecting its employees and creditors, good faith
will usually be found. 74
Another factor considered by the bankruptcy courts is the
debtor's conduct. In In re Andrews, 5 the court focused on the
debtor's motive for filing his Chapter 11 petition. The debtor
was trying to preserve the low interest rate on foreclosed property as a means of financing the acquisition with a minimum of
front money. The court concluded that the debtor did not act
with "that candor, frankness, sincerity and willingness to do equity which are the indicia of good faith. ' 7' False material statements to the court,7 7 failure to maintain books or records, 75 an
asserted ignorance of the contents of financial statements signed
by the debtor,7 9 unexplained absences from court hearings, 80 and
failure to list substantial assets, liens, or unsecured debts in the
Chapter 11 schedules81 have been considered evidence of a
82
debtor's lack of good faith.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Good faith has remained an integral part of our bankruptcy
law despite its deletion as an express prerequisite for Chapter 11
reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Although still a viable mechanism available to creditors for dealing
with bad faith debtors, what debtor conduct constitutes a lack of
good faith is not always certain. Attempts to fraudulently invoke
the court's jurisdiction, to shield assets from the bankruptcy
court, or to obtain relief on the eve of foreclosure should signal

13 B.R. 578, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).

74. E.g., In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., 18 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982); In re
Alton Tel. Printing Co., 14 B.R. 238 (Bankr. S.D. MI1.
1981).
75. 17 B.R. 515 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982).
76. Id. at 518.
77. In re Verrazzano Towers, Inc., 10 B.R. 387 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
78. In re Pappas, 17 B.R. 662, 667 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
79. Id.
8o. Id.
81. Id.
82. In In re McLaury, 25 B.R. 30 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982), arguments at a hearing
cast doubt on the accuracy of the schedules of assets filed by the debtor, but the court
assumed that the schedules were substantially correct. Id. at 32. This assumption suggests that alleged discrepancies in the debtor's filings must be proved with concrete evidence before they will be considered indicative of bad
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to the courts and creditors that bad faith may be present. The
very nature of good faith precludes more precise guidelines, but
if creditors can demonstrate that the debtor's actions have
abused the judicial process or infringed on creditors' rights, then
dismissal for lack of good faith is a realistic possibility.
Diane B. McColl
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